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IN THE S·UPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LORENZO VERNAL EWELL,
Plaintiff,

vs.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH,
BYRON EWELL, doing business as
ASSOCIATED CONSTRUC'TION
COMPANY and THE STATE
INSURANC.E FUND,

Case No.
7700

Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

PRELIMINARY S·TATEMENT
Plaintiff herein will be referred to throughout as
plaintiff; The Industrial Commission will be referred
to as commission, and Byron Ewell and The State Insurance Fund as defendants.
All italics are ours.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This matter comes before this court on a Petition
for Writ of Cr.rtiqrari file,d by plainti~ ?:0. or about the
18th day of September, 1950. Plaintiff's application for
workmen's compensation was heard by The Industrial
Commission on the 22nd d~! ?f N oye.~ber, 1950 and on
the 5th day of March, 1951 The Industrial Commission
made its decision and denied a portion of plaintiff's
claim, namely, all medical expense incurred in the removal 9f t4e pterygium grQwt:q on plaintiff's left eye,
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that plaintiff received a flash

from a welders torch on May 29, 1950, while in the course
of his employment and that the flash caused a severe
inflammation and blister in plaintiff's eye. It further
found that the inflammation caused was not successfully
reduced until July 21, 1950. Plaintiff's eye was operated on by Dr.. Berman on the 29th day of July, 1950
at the Holy C·ross Hospital in Salt Lake City (R. 16).
The operation consisted of transplanting the pterygium
to a portio:p. of the eye where it would grow without
affec~ing the sight (R. 13). Pterygium is a growth of
the conjunctivial tissue caused by irritation of the eye,
such as results from dust, wind and sand striking the
eyeball. It is traumatic in its nature (R. 13).
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.A pterygium had been removed from plaintiff's
right eye in 1948 and at that time the pterygium in the
left eye was noted but it was not of sufficient size to
necessitate an operation (R. 13). Dr. Berman did not
see plaintiff between August of 1948 and July of 1950
(R. 13). The condition that was present in plaintiff's
eye in 1948 was one 'vhich would not disappear without
medical treatment, but the pterygium present at that
time was not affecting plaintiff's clear vision. By July
14, 1950, the pterygium had increased in size until it was
beginning to encroach on the cornea of the left eye
(R. 15). At the time Dr. Berman examined plaintiff, the
eye was inflamed and it was his opinion that surgical
correction was necessary (R. 15).
The doctor stated that a pterygium might not progress, but would remain stationary unless the eye itself
was irritated and an aggravation resulted. He was further of the opinion that the pterygium in plaintiff~s eye
had been aggravated by the flash from the welding
machine on May 29, 1950 (R.l6).
As to the rate of progress and growth of the
pterygium, Dr. Berman stated that anything coming in
contact with the pterygium would make it grow faster
and encroach on the cornea, but if nothing aggravated
it or irritated it, it could remain stationary for years
(R. 18). It was his opinion that if dust or other fine
materials were being blown into the eye, that that would
have a tendency to cause the pterygium to grow (R. 18).
He was unable to state whether or not the pterygium
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would have grown to the extent found in July, 1950
as a result solely of sand and dust striking the eyeball.
H·e was of the opinion that continuous exposure to dust,
etc., for approximately two years could possibly cause
the ·pterygium to increase in size and that such possibility was present, even though there had been no flash
burn (R. 21, 22).
Plaintiff and his wife were both sworn and testified.
Plaintiff testified that he was a steam shovel operator
and at said occupation dust and dirt were constantly
blowing off the shovel and into his face and eyes (R. 23).
Since 1948, after the operation by Dr. Berman on his
right eye, plaintiff had worked as a shovel operator.
He had not been bothered with any eye trouble. The first
eye difficulty he had was after receiving the flash burn
(R. 23, 24, 25). After the flash burn, plaintiff's eye
burned and smarted. The condition got worse every day
after the first injury on May 29 (R. 26) and by July 12th
plaintiff could no longer continue with his employment.
Plaintiff remained off the job from July 12th until
September 9, 1950 (R. 28).
Plaintiff's wife, Flossy E. Ewell, testified that between August ·of 1948 and May of 1950, plaintiff had
no· trouble with his eyes, but that since May 29, 1950,
plaintiff had had continuous trouble. She observed on his
eyeball small blisters, his face and eye were swollen after
the flash burn (R. 29). Between the 29th of May and
July 12th, the left eye was continuously inflamed, with
the lids swollen and the hall of the eye red (R. 30).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The rate of growth of the pterygium in the left eye
was impossible to discover because plaintiff was not
examined between the 1948 operation and July 14, 1950.
However, any irritation of the eye would cause the
pterygium to grow. The commission found that the
plaintiff had been working during the two years between
the first eye operation and the second, under conditions
conducive to the pterygium growth, but because the evidence did not support a finding that the irritation caused
by the flash accelerated the growth, they denied compensation for the operation and the disability between
July 21st and September 9, 1950.
Plaintiff filed his Application for Rehearing within
the time allowed by law and said application was by the
Commission denied on April 23, 1951.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PTERYGIUM IN PLAINTIFF'S LEFT EYE WAS
THE RESULT OF A COMPENSABLE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PTERYGIUM IN PLAINTIFF'S LEFT EYE WAS
THE RESULT OF A COMPENSABLE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT.

The Findings of Fact by the commission contain
the following language :
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"* * * Applicant's right eye was operated in
1948, and he was then told that the left eye would
sooner or later have to be operated."
And at a later point the opinion again states:

"* * * The probabilities are that surgery
would have been necessary whether or not the
flash incident had taken place."
From these statements plaintiff deduces that The
Industrial Commission believed and so found that the
only effect a flash burn on plaintiff's left eye had, was
to aggravate the pre-existing condition of the eye and
since plaintiff could not present evidence that the burn
caused the pterygium to increase its rate of growth, he
could not recover for the surgical operation.
The commission awarded plaintiff workmen's compensation for one week beginning July 14th and ending
July 21st, it found that plaintiff suffered a compensable
accident, but refused to allow plaintiff the expense of
the medical treatment which included the operation performed on July 29th. By refusing to allow plaintiff
compensation for the disability which occurred between
July 21st and September 9th, the commission has attempted to delineate between that portion of plaintiff's
condition which was directly attributable to the flash
burn and the disability resulting from the condition
present in his eye on the date of the flash burn.
Plaintiff submits that the commission has overlooked
material facts which would require a decision in his
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favor and an award of the full medical expenses incurred
by him, as well as the compensation for the total time
which he was disabled.
The eye condition from which plaintiff suffered and
which necessitated the surgical operation was caused by
either one or two forces acting separately or together:
(a) Plaintiff's eye condition may have been caused by
the impact of dust and sand on his eyeball between
August of 1948 and May 29, 1950; (b) The condition may
have been caused by the flash burn which occurred on
May 29, 1950; or (c) It may have been caused in part
by the sand and dust particles striking the eyeball and
in part by the flash burn which occurred on May 29,
1950.

In respect to the various causes, it is plaintiff's position that regardless of whether (a), (b) or (c) caused the
disability which required the surgical operation, he is
entitled to full compensation for all disability which he
has suffered.
Each and everyone of the causes of the damage to
plaintiff's eye arose out of or in the course of his employment and any disability caused by the individual cause
or by the causes combined and concurring would result in
a compensable accident to plaintiff.
It was, at the time of the commission hearing and is
now, plaintiff's position that the flash burn on May 29,
1950, accelerated the pterygium in plaintiff's eye and
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directly necessitated all of the medical treatment which
he received. But even assuming that The Industrial
Commission correctly views and understands the law
applicable to plaintiff's claim, still under the only evidence presented, plaintiff's eye condition and the pterygium existing in his left eye were aggravated by the flash
burn of May 29th.
Dr. Berman in stating his op1n1on concerning the
flash burn and the cause of the pterygium said (R. 16) :
"I don't think it would solely attribute to that.
I think the flash had aggravated the condition
of the pterygium itself or inflammation."
No other medical evidence was presented before the
Commission.
Dr. Berman's testimony when considered with the
testimony of plaintiff and his wife to the effect that
during the two years immediately preceding May 29th,
plaintiff had had no trouble with his left eye, would conclusively show that the flash burn irritated and aggravated plaintiff's eye and was the only irritant or aggravation of which he was conscious. The commission
finds that pterygiums are caused by irritation of the
tissues of the eyes.
The commission found that plaintiff while on
job during the two years immediately preceding
operation was exposed to conditions conducive to
growth of the pterygium. Those conditions were
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wind, dirt and dust in which he worked while operating
the power shovel. There was no evidence that the irritating condition conducive to the growth of the pterygium
existed at any other place in plaintiff's environment.
The commission without any evidence indulges in a presumption that plaintiff was subjected to the same dust
and dirt outside of his employment after the 1948 operation. The only reason that the commission could possibly
have in creating and relying upon such a nonexistent
presumption is for the purpose of defeating plaintiff's
claim on some effective ground.
Since 1922 it has been the law of this state that ari
injured workman is entitled to compensation not only
for the disability which directly flowed from an on the
job injury, but was also entitled to a compensation for
any disability resulting from an aggravation or acceleration of a diseased bodily condition existing at the time
when the injury was received. This principle was clearly
set forth and discussed at length in Pinyon Queen Mining:
Co., et al. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 59 Utah 402,
204 P. 323. The decision sets forth the liberal and humane
principles of law which should govern plaintiff's petition
in the present case.
In the Pinyon Queen case the workman had within
his body a latent syphilitic condition which in no way
arose out of or was incurred in the course of his employment. While on the job the workman received an injury
to his arm and it was stated and admitted that if the
workman had not been infected with the disease of
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syphilis, the injury to his arm would have fully recovered
within a period of six weeks. With the disease present,
the total disability extended to more than ten weeks.
The commission awarded compensation for the full ten
weeks disability, even though they found that the syphilitic condition prolonged his disability period.
This Court in its opinion discussed at length whether
or not compensation was required for resulting incapa<}ity where there was an existing disease aggravated by
accidental injury. It quoted from many cases from text
and treatise and finally arrived at the conclusion that
the commission had properly awarded full compensation
for all disability, whether the disability directly flowed
from the injury or was a result of a combining between
the injury and the latent disease condition. The Pinyon
Queen case has many authorities quoted therein and has
been followed and reaffirmed by this Court on many
occasions since its inception.
In cases such as Graybar Electric Co., Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, et al., 73 Utah 568, 276
P. 161, 162 this Court set forth its understanding of the
principle in the following language:
"It is no longer an open question in this state
that, other necessary conditions being present,
a pre-existing disease or other disturbed condition
of the physical structure of the body, when aggravated or lighted up by an accident, is compensable
under the act. Tintic Milling Co. v. Industrial
Commission, supra. The real point, however, is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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whether or not the strain from lifting which, it is
alleged, caused or lighted up the sacroiliac condition, was an accident."

It has applied the principle in such ~ases as Hammond v. Industrial Commission,
84 Utah 67, 34 P. 2d .687.
.
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There death was caused by exertion and
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acting
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upon a diseased circulatory system. No att~:q1pt wa~
made in either the Graybar or Hammond cases to .separate the portion of the cause of death attributabl~ to th~
immediate accidental injury and that portion which was
attributable to the latent disease of. the inj~;red workman.
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In Cherdran Const. Co. v. Simpkins, 61 "Qtah ~93,
214 P. 593; ther~ was ~gain presented·t~ this ·c~l1rt.th~
problem of whether or not latent physical conditions upon.
which accid~ntal injury acted to cause death
sho~d in
.
..
any way affect the amount of the award. Again this
court reaffirmed the principles set forth in the Pinyon
Queen case and found that the total result was compensable under our Utah Workmen's Compensation Law.
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See also Gerber v. Industrial Commission,
479, 64 P. 2d 1281.

'

~1 l!t~

In the light of the foregoing authorities, which have
clearly set forth the principle that even in cases where
the accidental injury combines with a disease, which was

in no way connected with the applicant's employment,
full compensation should be awarded, it is inconceivable
that a proper interpretation of the Workmen's ComSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pensation Laws of the State of Utah would deny compensation for disability caused by two compensable
accidental injuries.
The evidence shows without dispute that the flash
burn on plaintiff's left eye aggravated the condition of
the eye, causing it to be inflamed and irritated. The only
other irritative condition on which there was evidence
was also an on the job type of injury, namely, dust and
sand blown into plaintiff's eye.
It is respectfully submitted that the decision which
The Industrial Commission has made is contrary to the
undisputed substantial evidence presented at the hearings, is arbitrary and capricious and unlawfully defeats
plaintiff in his substantial rights under Workmen's Compensation Laws. The decision nullifies and destroys the
liberal humane purposes which worlunen's compensation
was designed to accomplish. The injustice of the commission's decision can only be appreciated when the size
of the award which they have refused to make is viewed
in the light of the limited economic means of plaintiff.
Vindication of the liberal humane purposes of Workmen's Compensation legislation demands that this court
determine that the commission has acted in excess of its
powers and plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensation for the time which he was disabled and for the
medical expenses which he incurred in the removal of the
pterygium from his left eye.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that this court should
determine that the decision of The Industrial Commission
is in excess of its powers and that plaintiff is entitled
to an award of full compensation for the time which he
was disabled between July 21, 1950, and September 9,
1950, and for the medical expenses incurred by him in the
surgical removal of the pterygium on his left eye.
Respectfully submitted,
DWIGHT L. KING,

Attorney for Plaintiff,
530 Judge Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Received .................... copies of the within Brief of
Appellant this ·-·--··············· day of July, A. D. 1951.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

By ····-····--·---···············································

THE STATE INSURANCE FUND

By ······························································

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

